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Destiny’s Conditions: Joseph Hooker’s Long Winter with the Army of the
Potomac
The Civil War must occupy the top rank as the least forgotten conflict in the
American experience with warfare. Nevertheless, despite many thousands of
books and articles on the American Civil War, there are aspects of that conflict
that remain unfamiliar to many readers more than one hundred fifty years later.
Albert Z. Conner and Chris Mackowski explore one of these episodes in their
history of the Army of the Potomac during a largely overlooked three-month
period from January 26 to the end of April 1863.
In Seizing Destiny: The Army of the Potomac’s “Valley Forge” and the
Civil War Winter that Saved the Union, the authors examine the revival of the
Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s command after its defeat
at Fredericksburg and the infamous Mud March under Maj. Gen. Ambrose E.
Burnside. Depression, desertion, and disease affected an Army that had been
beaten down physically and mentally when it moved into winter quarters on the
north bank of the Rappahannock. When Burnside offered to resign following
these two disasters, Lincoln replaced him with his insubordinate subordinate,
Hooker, who had commanded the Center Grand Division at Fredericksburg.
The relationship between Abraham Lincoln and Joe Hooker began with
probably the most singular letter of appointment ever issued by a political leader
to the general in command of the war’s most important theater. Lincoln wrote,
“General: I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I
have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and I think it
best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite
satisfied with you.”
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Lincoln tells Hooker that his behavior toward General Ambrose Burnside,
his predecessor, was “a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and
honorable brother officer.” He then informs Hooker that “I have heard ... of your
recently saying that both the Army and the Government needed a dictator. Of
course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the Command.”
Then he bluntly challenges Hooker: “Only those generals who gain successes
can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the
dictatorship” (49-50).
After his appointment Hooker said, “...I trembled at the task before me, in
entering upon so important a command” (51). And well he might. As Seizing
Destiny illustrates, Hooker’s tenure as commander began with the Army racked
by exhaustion, desertions, illness, harsh weather, and slumping morale. Over the
next few months, Hooker worked to achieve the success Lincoln demanded by
returning to military fundamentals to regenerate the morale and fighting power
of the Army of the Potomac. Conner and Mackowski tell the story of that
renewal.
Seizing Destiny is the result of research that takes advantage of many
hundreds of primary manuscript sources located at the Fredericksburg and
Spotsylvania National Military Park. As the bibliography notes, over 500
volumes exist in the Park’s Bound Volume Collection. They, in addition to
several other important private collections, provide the material for Seizing
Destiny. The official military and naval records collected and printed by the
Government Printing Office in the late nineteenth century also are referenced
throughout along with many contemporary newspapers and periodicals, diaries
and correspondence collections, and numerous regimental histories. The words
of soldiers of all ranks supplemented by a broad sampling of other material
create an interesting depiction of an army undergoing a complex process of
recovery, renewal, and preparation.
The basic argument of Seizing Destiny turns on two concepts, the strategic 
pause and the non-battle turning point. Saratoga, Buena Vista, Midway, Inchon, 
and Tet are battles that historians have identified as turning points in American 
military history. Gettysburg and Vicksburg are considered turning points in the 
Civil War. Less attention-grabbing are the measures taken (or that ought to have 
been taken) in the weeks and months before those battles to create the conditions 
for victory (or defeat). That is the purview of Seizing Destiny. Indispensable to
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the realization of this non-battle turning point is what the authors call a “strategic
pause.”
The authors write that the strategic pause is “regrettably (but revealingly)
missing from U.S. military historical terminology,” but it is doubtful that
experienced regular Army officers were unfamiliar with the need occasionally to
suspend operations to rest and regroup (xii). Even successful armies must halt
and reorganize from time to time to allow supporting units and supply trains to
catch up. Moreover, in January 1863 as the Mud March makes clear, the weather
dictated a pause in military operations as much as any deliberate plan by Union
leadership to refrain from battle.
As for the use of the label “strategic” in relation to this pause, the term
“operational pause” is more accurate. Suggesting that the national war
effort—i.e., the strategic level of war—was suspended just because one Federal
army was stuck in the Virginia mud is inaccurate and overlooks activities in
other theaters. Still, there’s no arguing over the fact that the eastern front was
seen as the most important theater, and it was there that Hooker went to work.
Styled “Fighting Joe” as the result of a chance headline, Hooker set his
organizational and leadership skills to work rebuilding the worn out Army of the
Potomac for a new spring campaign while continuing to fight minor
engagements around the Army’s northern Virginia winter quarters (97, 199).
Hooker is given credit by the authors for the reformation of the Army. They
specifically point out that the Army’s turnaround could not have occurred before
Hooker’s tenure and that there wasn’t time after his removal from command for
Gen. George Meade to put his stamp on the Army before Gettysburg.(x-xi)
However, it is worth noting that many of the problems encountered by Hooker
echoed the chaos of the early days faced by Gen. George McClellan when he
transformed the Army after First Bull Run. Then, everything—manned defenses,
proper encampments, troop training, extended enlistments, and even regular
discipline to keep the men in camp—was lacking. Little Mac advanced the work
on these formative problems even if he proved not to be the field commander
needed to lead the Army successfully in battle. Hooker by contrast did not have
to deal with such utterly raw conditions; he could build on some of foundations
laid by the earlier commanders and on the recent battlefield experiences of the
soldiers in the ranks, who by January 1863 were well on their way to becoming
true veterans.
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Hooker proved to be an able administrator. Operating on the principle that a
commander gets what he inspects and not what he expects, Hooker added an
inspector-general to his staff (183). His administrative reforms corrected
problems of supply and transportation and provided the Union soldiers with
fresher food, new clothing, improved medical care, and better discipline. Private
George Wolcott wrote home to tell his family that “I am still in enjoyment of
excellent health and would you believe it, weight 167 lbs.—19 lbs. more than
ever before in my life” (168). Hooker also reformed the leave system, a
necessary corrective that kept soldiers from wandering away from the camps
without authority while permitting those men with valid reasons to take time
away from camp. He made way for the promotion of officers of proven merit
and fired incompetent officers as a 7th Wisconsin captain reported in a letter.
“Gen. Hooker is weeding it out, almost every day there are a number of officers
dismissed the service ... hurrah for Old Joe as the boys call him” (109, 168,
291-292). Hooker enhanced training, and as the authors noted, by mid-February
“Discipline and training were accepted in a businesslike manner by the soldiers
and junior officers” (141). As a result of all this work, desertions declined,
morale increased, and the Army’s self-confidence grew.
Hooker also undertook other changes to what is now called the Table of
Organization and Equipment (T/O&E;), some more successful than others. He
reorganized the Army’s cavalry into a cavalry corps, which soon proved its value
against the Confederate units that had previously tormented Union forces (90),
and created a military intelligence bureau under Colonel George H. Sharpe to
replace the informal organization that had existed previously (100). He also
made changes to the Army’s artillery organization that made it less effective
during the coming battle at Chancellorsville (90).
It takes more than a dozen weeks, or even a dozen months, to make an 
effective army. In Northern Virginia in early 1863 there was time enough, 
however, for Hooker—whose modifications and improvements of the Army 
were informed by recent experience—to build on the work of those who had 
gone before. These housekeeping, administrative, and logistical tasks are not 
sexy. Nearly all readers and too many historians prefer the grand sweep of battle 
and the political intrigues that exist behind the lines. Fans of drum-and-trumpet 
history regularly fail to appreciate the long support and experience tail that 
extends behind the spear point of a successful modern army. The Romans knew 
the importance of this work. “They do not wait for the war to begin before 
handling their arms,” as Josephus wrote in The Jewish War, and “It would not be
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far from the truth to call their drills bloodless battles, their battles bloody drills.”
Training, supply, sound organization, and competent administration are crucial if
not necessarily sufficient for victory.
That this was so was proven when Hooker put the Army on the road in late
April 1863. Gen. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia remained in position around
Fredericksburg, and Hooker, now commanding a rested and ready Army, set out
to destroy Lee’s force, saying “May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will
have none” (230). For various reasons, Hooker’s offensive failed despite the
reorganization of the Army. It may seem like a peculiar sort of turning point that
the Army Hooker had rebuilt immediately failed its first test at Chancellorsville,
but Conner and Mackowski argue that the key conclusion to be drawn from this
period is that the Army did not break or falter as it had done after Fredericksburg
(268-269). Nevertheless, Lincoln fired Hooker on June 28, 1863, replacing him
with Maj. Gen. George G. Meade just prior to the battle of Gettysburg. Hooker,
like McClellan before him, left a legacy of an incrementally more professional,
more honed military tool than the one he found. If he proved not to be the man to
wield it, he helped form the edge until that man arrived.
It is a belief firmly held by military professionals that the study of military
history is a fundamental part of understanding and preparing for war. The story
of Hooker’s reforms as told in Seizing Destiny by Albert Z. Conner, Jr., who
passed away in May 2016, and Chris Mackowski will be another source soldiers
should study.
Larry Grant is an adjunct professor of history at the Citadel.
_______________________
1 As James M. McPherson wrote in an essay in Jefferson Davis\'s Generals
(Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 172), “...Lee was far
from alone in perceiving Virginia as the most important theater. Most people in
the North and South alike, as well as European observers, shared that view.”
2 Josephus, The Jewish War, trans. G. A. Williamson, Middlesex, UK:
Penguin, 1969, pp. 194-195
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